We show that the problem of finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with seven pure strategies is complete in PPAD, when the approximation parameter is exponentially small in the number of players.
INTRODUCTION
The celebrated theorem of Nash [27, 28] states that every game has an equilibrium point. The concept of Nash equilibrium has been tremendously influential in economics and social sciences ever since (e.g., see [24] ), and its computation has been one the most well-studied problems in the area of Algorithmic Game Theory. For normal form games with a bounded number of players, much progress has been made during the past decade in understanding both the complexity of Nash equilibrium as well as its efficient approximation.
In this paper, we study a large and important class of succinct multiplayer games called anonymous games (see [33, 26, 4, 5, 25] for studies of such games in the economics literature). These are special multiplayer games in that the payoff of each player depends only on (1) the pure strategy of the player herself, and (2) the number of other players playing each pure strategy, instead of the full pure strategy profile.
In such a game, the (expected) payoff of a player is highly symmetric over (pure or mixed) strategies of other players. For instance, two players switching their strategies would not affect the payoff of any other player in the game. A consequence of this special payoff structure is that O(αn α−1 ) numbers suffice to describe the payoff function of a player, when there are α pure strategies shared by n players. This is polynomial in the number of players when α is bounded, and hence the game is succinctly representable. Throughout the * Supported by NSF grant CCF-1149257 and a Sloan research fellowship. † Supported by NSF grant CCF-1149257.
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Other well-studied classes of multiplayer and succinct representable games include graphical, symmetric, and congestion games (e.g., see [29] ). Although graphical and congestion games are known to be hard to solve [15, 22, 1, 34] there is indeed a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an exact Nash equilibrium in a symmetric game [29] . Given that anonymous games generalize symmetric games by allowing player-dependent payoff functions, it is a natural question to ask whether there is an efficient algorithm for finding an exact or approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game.
Culminating in a sequence of beautiful papers [16, 14, 17, 18, 19] Daskalakis and Papadimitriou obtained a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for -approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games with a bounded number of strategies (see more discussions on related work in Section 1.1). However, the complexity of finding an exact Nash equilibrium in such games remains open, and was conjectured to be hard for PPAD in [18, 19] . 1 In this paper, we give an affirmative answer to the conjecture of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou by showing that it is PPAD-complete to find an -approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game, when the approximation parameter is exponentially small in n. To state our main result, we let (α, c)-Anonymous denote the problem of finding a (2 −n c )-approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with α pure strategies and payoffs from [0, 1].
2
Here is our main theorem: Theorem 1 (Main). For any α ≥ 7 and c > 0, the problem (α, c)-Anonymous is PPAD-complete.
The greatest challenge behind the proof of our main theorem is posed by the rather complex but also highly symmetric payoff structure of anonymous games. Before discussing our approach and techniques in Section 1.3, we first review related work in Section 1.1, then define anonymous games formally and introduce some useful notation in Section 1.2.
1 When the number of pure strategies is a sufficiently large constant, an anonymous game with rational payoffs may not have any rational equilibrium (e.g., by embedding in it a rational three-player game with no rational equilibrium). Even in the case of two pure strategies, it was recently shown in [23] that there are anonymous games with rational payoffs but irrational equilibria only. 2 Since we are interested in the additive approximation, all payoffs are normalized to take values in [0, 1].
Related Work
Anonymous games have been studied extensively in the economics literature [33, 30, 26, 4, 5, 25, 21] where the game being considered is usually nonatomic and consists of a continuum of players but only a finite number of strategies. For the discrete setting, two special families of anonymous games are symmetric games [29, 6] and congestion games [31] . [29] gave a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an exact Nash equilibrium in a symmetric game. PLS-completeness of pure equilibria in congestion games was established in [22, 1, 34] 3 and efficient approximation algorithms for congestion games with various latency functions were obtained in [8, 9, 13] .
While an anonymous game does not possess a pure Nash equilibrium in general, it was shown in [16, 2, 19] that when the payoff functions are λ-Lipschitz, there always exists an -approximate pure Nash equilibrium and it can be found in polynomial time, where has a linear dependency on λ. Furthermore, in [3] Babichenko presented a best-reply dynamic for λ-Lipschitz anonymous games with two strategies which reaches an approximate pure equilibrium in O(n log n) steps.
Regarding our specific point of interest in this paper, i.e., Nash equilibria in anonymous games with a scaling number of players but a non-scaling number of strategies, there have been a sequence of positive and negative results obtained by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [16, 17, 14, 18] (summarized in the journal version [19] ). We review these results below.
In [16] , Daskalakis and Papadimitriou presented a PTAS for finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with two strategies. The running time of the algorithm is n O(1/ 2 ) · U , where U is the number of bits needed to describe the payoffs. This was subsequently improved in [14] to poly(n) · (1/ ) [16] is based on the existence of an -approximate Nash equilibrium consisting of integer multiples of 2 , while the PTAS in [14] is based on the existence of an -approximate equilibrium that satisfies the following property: either at most O(1/ 3 ) players play mixed strategies, or all players that mix share the same mixed strategy. Later [17] extended the result of [16] , giving the only known PTAS for anonymous games with any bounded number of pure strategies with time n g(α,1/ ) U for some function g of α, number of pure strategies, and 1/ .
All PTAS of [16, 14, 17] are so-called oblivious algorithms [18] , i.e., algorithms that enumerate a set of mixed strategy profiles that is independent of the game as candidates for an approximate Nash equilibrium (hence, the game is used only to verify if a given mixed strategy profile is an -approximate equilibrium). Daskalakis and Papadimitriou studied oblivious algorithms [18] , and showed that any such algorithm for anonymous games has running time exponential in 1/ . In contrast, for anonymous games of two strategies, they gave a non-oblivious PTAS with time poly(n) · (1/ )
Recently in [23] Goldberg and Turchetta studied the query complexity of Nash equilibria in anonymous games and presented a randomized algorithm that finds a O( + 1/( √ n))-approximate equilibirum withÕ(n 11/8 / 2 ) payoff queries.
Anonymous and Polymatrix Games
Before giving a high-level description of our approach and techniques in Section 1.3, we first define anonymous games formally and introduce some notation. We then define poly-matrix games as they will serve as the starting point of our reduction. Consider a game with players [n] = {1, . . . , n} and pure strategies [α] = {1, . . . , α} with α being a constant. For each strategy b ∈ [α], we let ψ b (t) denote the number of b's in a tuple t ∈ [α] n−1 , and write Ψ(t) = (ψ1(t), . . . , ψα(t)), which we refer to as the histogram of pure strategies in t.
In an anonymous game, the payoff of a player p ∈ [n] depends only on Ψ(s−p) and her own strategy sp, given a pure strategy profile s ∈ [α]
n . (We follow the convention and use
n−1 to denote the pure strategy profile of the n − 1 players other than player p in s.) Informally, Ψ(s−p) can be viewed as what player p "sees" in the game when s is played.
We now formally define anonymous games.
Definition 2. An anonymous game G = (n, α, {payoff p }) consists of n players, α pure strategies, and a payoff function
, where K = (k1, . . . , kα) : kj ∈ Z ≥0 and α j=1 kj = n − 1 is the set of all histograms of pure strategies played by n − 1 players. Specifically, when a pure strategy profile s ∈ [α] n is played, the payoff of player p is given by payoff p (sp, Ψ(s−p)).
In such a game, a mixed strategy of a player is a probability distribution x = (x1, . . . , xα), and a mixed strategy profile X is an ordered tuple of n mixed strategies (xp : p ∈ [n]), one for each player p. Given X , let up(b, X ) denote the expected payoff of p playing pure strategy b ∈ [α]:
where we use PrX [p, k] to denote the probability of player p seeing histogram k under X :
where sq denotes the pure strategy of player q from a profile s−p ∈ Ψ −1 (k). We also let up(X ) denote the expected payoff of player p from playing xp:
We also point out that even though up(b, X ) has exponentially many terms, it can be computed in polynomial time by dynamic programming when α is a constant. For a detailed presentation of the algorithm for anonymous games with two strategies, see [19] . This then implies that checking whether a given profile X is a (approximate) Nash equilibrium is in polynomial time.
Next we define (approximate) Nash equilibria.
Definition 3 (Approximate Nash Equilibria). Let G = (n, α, {payoff p }) denote an anonymous game. Then we say a mixed strategy profile X = (xp :
For ≥ 0, we say X is an -approximate Nash equilibrium of G if up(X )+ ≥ up(b, X ) for all p ∈ [n] and b ∈ [α]; we say X is an -well-supported Nash equilibrium if up(a, X ) + < up(b, X ) implies that xp,a = 0, for all p ∈ [n] and a, b ∈ [α].
As discussed later in Section 1.3, the PPAD hardness part of Theorem 1 is proved via a polynomial-time reduction from the problem of finding a well-supported Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game (e.g. see [7] ). For our purposes here, such a game with n players and two strategies each player can be described by a payoff matrix A ∈ [0, 1] 2n×2n , with A k, = 0 for all k, ∈ {2i − 1, 2i} and i ∈ [n].
Each player i ∈ [n] has two strategies that correspond to rows 2i − 1, 2i of A. Let Aj denote the jth row of A. Given a vector y ∈ R 2n ≥0 , where (y2i−1, y2i) is the mixed strategy of player i, expected payoffs of player i for playing rows 2i − 1 and 2i are given by A2i−1 · y and A2i · y, respectively.
An -well supported Nash equilibrium of A is then a vector y ∈ R 2n ≥0 such that y2i−1 + y2i = 1 and A2i−1 · y > A2i · y + ⇒ y2i = 0 and
We need the following result on polymatrix games:
Theorem 4. The problem of finding a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game is PPAD-complete.
Theorem 4 follows from results in [15, 10] (also see [12] for a complete proof). Recently, it was shown that the problem remains PPAD-hard even for constant approximation [32] .
Our Approach and Techniques
We prove the PPAD-hardness of anonymous games via a reduction from the problem of finding a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game. Given a 2n × 2n input polymatrix game A, our reduction constructs an anonymous game G A with n "main" players {P1, . . . , Pn} and two auxiliary players. We have each main player Pi simulate in a way player i in the polymatrix game, i ∈ [n], so that any -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G A with an exponentially small can be used to recover a (1/n)-well-supported equilibrium of the polymatrix game A efficiently. Theorem 1 then follows from a standard procedure that converts an approximate equilibrium to a well-supported equilibrium (e.g., see [15] ). In the full paper [11] we also include a tighter analysis of the procedure for anonymous games. Throughout the rest of the paper we focus on well-supported Nash equilibria.
The greatest challenge to establishing such a reduction is posed by the complex but also highly structured and symmetric expression of expected payoffs in an anonymous game. As discussed earlier in Section 1.2, the expected payoff up(b, X ) of a player p is a linear form of probabilities PrX [p, k], each of which is a function over mixed strategies of other players. This complex function makes it difficult to reason about the set of well-supported equilibria of an anonymous game, not to mention our goal is to embed a polymatrix game A in it. To overcome this obstacle we need to find a special (but still hard enough) family of anonymous games with certain payoff structures that allow us to perform a careful analysis and understand their well-supported equilibria. The bigger obstacle for our reduction, however, is to in some sense remove the anonymity of the players and break the inherent symmetry underlying an anonymous game.
To see this, a natural approach to obtain a reduction from polymatrix games is to directly encode the 2n variables of y in mixed strategies of the n "main" players {P1, . . . , Pn}. More specifically we use {s1, s2} to denote two special strategies of G A and attempt to encode (y2i−1, y2i) in (xi,s 1 , xi,s 2 ), probabilities of Pi playing s1, s2, respectively. The reduction would work if expected payoffs of Pi from s1 and s2 in G A can always match closely expected payoffs of player i from rows 2i − 1 and 2i in A, given by two linear forms A2i−1 · y and A2i · y of y. However, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to construct G A with this property since anonymous games are highly symmetric: the expected payoff of Pi is a symmetric function over mixed strategies of other players. This is not the case for polymatrix games: a linear form such as A2i · y in general has different coefficients for different variables yj, so different players contribute with different weights to the expected payoff of player i (notably the problem of finding a well-supported equilibrium in A becomes trivial if we require that every row of A has the same entry).
An alternative approach is to encode the 2n variables of y in probabilities PrX [p, k] . This may look appealing because expected payoffs up(b, X ) are linear forms of these probabilities so one can set up the coefficients payoff p (b, k) to match them easily with linear forms Aj · y that appear in the polymatrix game A. However, the histogram k seen by a player p (as a vector-valued random variable) is the sum of n − 1 vector-valued random variables, each distributed according to the mixed strategy of a player other than player p. The way these probabilities PrX [p, k] are derived imposes strong restrictions on them, which were analyzed and exploited in [14, 17, 20] . Thus, it is a difficult task to obtain a correspondence between the 2n free variables in y and PrX [p, k].
Our reduction indeed follows the first approach of encoding (y2i−1, y2i) in (xi,s 1 , xi,s 2 ) of player Pi. More exactly, the former is the normalization of the latter into a probability distribution. To overcome the difficulty posed by symmetry, we enforce a "scaling" property in every well-supported equilibrium X of G A : probabilities of Pi playing {s1, s2} satisfy
where N is exponentially large in n. This is established by first designing an anonymous game called generalized radix game G * n,N , and using it as the base game in the construction of G A . We show that the "scaling" property holds for every anonymous game that is payoff-wise close to G * n,N . In particular, it holds for any well-supported equilibrium of G A as long as we make sure that G A is close to G * n,N . The "scaling" property plays a crucial role in our reduction because, as the base game for G A , it helps us reason about well-supported Nash equilibria of G A ; it also removes anonymity of the n "main" players Pi (since they must play the two special pure strategies {s1, s2} with probabilities of different scales) and overcome the symmetry barrier.
Equipped with the "scaling" property we prove a key technical lemma called the estimation lemma. It shows that one can compute efficiently coefficients of a linear form of probabilities of histograms PrX [Pi, k] seen by Pi, which guarantees to approximate additively xj,s 1 (or xj,s 2 ), i.e., probability of another player Pj playing strategy s1 (or s2), whenever the profile X satisfies the "scaling" property (this holds when G A is close to G * n,N and X is a well-supported quilibrium of G A ). As (y2j−1, y2j) ≈ N j (xj,s 1 , xj,s 2 ) given the scaling property these linear forms for xj,s 1 , xj,s 2 can be combined to derive a linear form of PrX [Pi, k] to approximate additively any linear form of y, particularly A2i−1 · y or A2i · y that appear as expected payoffs of player i in the polymatrix game A.
The proof of the estimation lemma is the technically most involved part of the paper (see Section 4). We indeed obtain explicit expressions for coefficients of the desired linear form where substantial cancellations yield an additive approximation of xj,s 1 (or xj,s 2 ).
Combining all ingredients highlighted here, we construct an anonymous game G A from an input polymatrix game A. This is done by first using the estimation lemma to compute for each player Pi coefficients of linear forms of probabilities PrX [Pi, k] seen by Pi that yield additive approximations of xj,s 1 and xj,s 2 . We use these coefficients to perturb the payoff function of each player Pi in the generalized radix game G * n,N so that 1) the resulting game G A is close to G * n,N and thus, any well-supported equilibrium X of G A automatically satisfies the "scaling" property; 2) expected payoffs of each player Pi playing {s1, s2} in a well-supported equilibrium X of G A match additively expected payoffs of player i playing rows 2i − 1, 2i in A, given y derived from X by normalizing (xj,s 1 , xj,s 2 ) for each j. The correctness of the reduction, i.e. y is a (1/n)-well-supported equilibrium of A whenever X is an -well-supported equilibrium of G A with an exponentially small , follows from these properties of G A .
Organization
We define the radix game Gn,N in Section 2 and as a warm up show that it has a unique Nash equilibrium. We then use Gn,N to define the generalized radix game G * n,N , and characterize -well-supported Nash equilibria of anonymous games that are close to G * n,N . Next, we prove the PPAD-hardness part of Theorem 1 in Section 3 using a polynomial-time reduction from polymatrix games, with the estimation lemma proved in Section 4. All missing proofs and the membership part of Theorem 1 can be found in the full version [11] .
THE GENERALIZED RADIX GAME
In this section, we first define a (n + 2)-player anonymous game Gn,N called the radix game, which has a unique Nash equilibrium of a specific form: Given any integer parameter N ≥ 2 of the game, each of the n "main" players mixes over the first two strategies with probabilities 1/N i and 1−1/N i , respectively, for each i ∈ [n], in the unique Nash equilibrium; the remaining two auxiliary players are only created to help enforce the aforementioned property.
The radix game Gn,N shares similarities with those anonymous games used in [18] to prove that any oblivious approximation algorithm for anonymous games runs in exponential time in 1/ . Both games use six pure strategies and add two auxiliary players to enforce each of the main players to play a specific mixed strategy in the unique Nash equilibrium.
Game 1 (Radix Game).
Let n ≥ 1, N ≥ 2 be two integer parameters, and δ = 1/N .
Let Gn,N denote the following anonymous game with n + 2 players {P1, . . . , Pn, Q, R} and six pure strategies {s, t, q1, q2, r1, r2}. We refer to {P1, . . . , Pn} as the main players. Each player Pi is only interested in strategies s and t (e.g., by setting her payoff of playing any other four strategies to be −1 no matter what other players play). Player Q is only interested in {q1, q2}, and player R is only interested in {r1, r2}.
Next, we define the payoff function of each player. When describing the payoff function of a player, we use k = (ks, kt, kq 1 , kq 2 , kr 1 , kr 2 ) to denote the histogram this player sees.
For each
The payoff of Pi when she plays t depends on kr 1 only: payoff P i (t, k) is 2 if kr 1 = 1, and is 0 otherwise. 2] . Because Pi is interested in {s, t}, Q is interested in {q1, q2} and R is interested in {r1, r2}, each Nash equilibrium X of Gn,N can be fully specified by a tuple
The payoff of player
where xi denotes the probability of Pi playing s, y denotes the probability of Q playing q1 and z denotes the probability of R playing r1.
Given an X = (x1, . . . , xn, y, z), we calculate the expected payoff of each player as follows (we skip X in the expected payoffs up(b, X ), when it is clear from the context; we use ui to denote the expected payoff of player Pi instead of uP i for convenience): the expected payoff of Pi for playing s is
The expected payoff of player Pi for playing t is ui(t) = 2z. The expected payoff of player Q for playing q1 is
The expected payoff of Q for playing q2 is uQ(q2) = z. The expected payoff of player R for playing r1 is uR(r1) = y and that for r2 is uR(r2) = 1 − y.
We show that xi = δ i in any Nash equilibrium X of Gn,N . We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 5. In a Nash equilibrium X = (x1, . . . , xn, y, z) of Gn,N , we have that z = i∈[n] xi.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that we have z > i xi. Since uQ(q2) > uQ(q1) and X is a Nash equilibrium, player Q never plays q1 and thus, y = 0. This in turn implies that uR(r2) = 1 > 0 = uR(r1) and z = 0, which contradicts with the assumption that z > i xi ≥ 0.
Next assume for contradiction that z < i xi, giving that uQ(q2) < uQ(q1). Thus, player Q never plays q2, and y = 1. This in turn implies that uR(r1) > uR(r2) and z = 1, which contradicts with the assumption that z < i xi ≤ 1 (since xi ∈ [0, 1]). This finishes the proof of the lemma.
We show that xi = δ i in any Nash equilibrium X of Gn,N .
Lemma 6. In a Nash equilibrium X = (x1, . . . , xn, y, z) of Gn,N , we have xi = δ i for all i ∈ [n].
Proof. First we show that i∈[n] xi = i∈[n] δ i . Consider for contradiction the following two cases:
This then implies that xi = 1, contradicting with the assumption that xi < δ i < 1 as N ≥ 2.
This then implies that xi = 0, contradicting with the assumption that xi > δ i > 0.
As a result, we must have i xi = i δ i , which also implies that xi > 0 for all i ∈ [n].
Now we are ready to show that xi = δ i for every i ∈ [n]. Assume for contradiction that xi = δ i for some i. If xi < δ i , then the same strict inequality (1) holds for Pi, and implies that xi = 1, contradicting with xi < δ i < 1. If xi > δ i , then the same strict inequality (2) holds for Pi and thus, xi = 0, contradicting with xi > δ i > 0. This finishes the proof.
Next we use the radix game Gn,N to define an anonymous game G * n,N called the generalized radix game. The latter has the same set of n + 2 players {P1, . . . , Pn, Q, R}, but seven pure strategies {s1, s2, t, q1, q2, r1, r2}. To obtain G * n,N from Gn,N , we simply replace the pure strategy s with two of its duplicate strategies s1 and s2 in G * n,N , and make sure that players in G * n,N treat s1 and s2 the same as the old strategy s and have their payoff functions derived from those of players in Gn,N in this fashion. (This is the same trick used to derive the generalized matching pennies game from matching pennies in previous PPAD-hardness results on Nash equilibria in normal form games [15, 10] . ) We define G * n,N formally as follows.
Game 2 (Generalized Radix Game G * n,N ). Let n ≥ 1, N ≥ 2 be two integer parameters, and δ = 1/N . Let G * n,N denote an anonymous game with the same n + 2 players as in Gn,N but seven strategies {s1, s2, t, q1, q2, r1, r2}. The payoff function payoff * T of a player T in G * n.N is defined using payoff T of the same player T in Gn,N as follows: payoff * T b, ks 1 , ks 2 , kt, kq 1 , kq 2 , kr 1 , kr 2 = payoff T φ(b), ks 1 + ks 2 , kt, kq 1 , kq 2 , kr 1 , kr 2 , where φ(s1) = φ(s2) = s and φ(b) = b for other strategies.
Given the definition of G * n,N from Gn,N Lemma 6 suggests that xi = xi,1 + xi,2 = δ i , for all i ∈ [n], in every Nash equilibrium X of G * n,N . This indeed follows from the main lemma of this section, Lemma 9 below, concerning -well-supported equilibria of not only G * n,N itself, but also anonymous games obtained by perturbing payoff entries of G * n,N . To state the lemma, we define anonymous games that are close to G * n,N . We use the following notation. Given x, y ∈ R and ξ ≥ 0, we write x = y ± ξ to denote |x − y| ≤ ξ. Definition 7. Given ξ ≥ 0, we say an anonymous game G is ξ-close to G * n,N if 1) G has the same set of n + 2 players and same set of seven strategies as G * n,N ; 2) For each of the n + 2 players T , her payoff function payoff T in G satisfies
for all pure strategies b and all histograms k.
When and ξ are small enough, each player in a game G that is ξ-close to G * n,N remains only interested in a subset of strategies only. The proof can be found in the full version.
Lemma 8. Let G be an anonymous game ξ-close to G * n,N for some ξ ≥ 0. When 2ξ + < 1, any -well-supported Nash equilibrium X of G satisfies: each Pi only plays {s1, s2, t}; Q only plays {q1, q2}; R only plays {r1, r2}.
It follows that an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G is described by a (2n + 2)-tuple X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]), when ξ and satisfy 2ξ + < 1: xi,1 (xi,2) is the probability of Pi playing s1 (or s2), y is the probability of Q playing q1, and z is the probability of R playing r1.
Recall that δ = 1/N ≤ 1/2. Let κ = i∈[n] δ i . Below we state the main lemma of this section.
Lemma 9. Let G be an anonymous game that is ξ-close to G * n,N . Assume that ξ, ≥ 0 satisfy
Then any -well-supported Nash equilibrium X of G satisfies
The proof can be found in the full paper [11] , which generalizes arguments used in proofs of Lemma 5 and 6 to analyze well-supported Nash equilibria of a game G close to G * n.N .
REDUCTION FROM POLYMATRIX GAMES TO ANONYMOUS GAMES
In this section, we give a polynomial-time reduction from the problem of computing a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game to that of computing an -well supported Nash equilibrium in a seven-strategy anonymous game, where = 2 −n 6 . (The gap between n 6 and n c , ∀ c > 0, in the statement of Theorem 1 can be filled in by a standard padding argument; see the full paper [11] for details.)
We first give some intuition behind the reduction in Section 3.1. Details of the reduction and its proof of correctness are presented in Section 3.2.
Overview of the Reduction
Given as an input a polymatrix game A ∈ [0, 1] 2n×2n , our goal is to construct in polynomial time an anonymous game G A , and show that every -well-supported equilibrium of G A can be used to recover a (1/n)-well-supported equilibrium of A in polynomial time.
Given A, we construct G A by perturbing payoff functions of the generalized radix game G * n,N with N = 2 n so that G A is ξ-close to G * n,N , for some exponentially small ξ > 0 to be specified later. (Thus, G A has the same set of n + 2 players as well as the same set of seven pure strategies as G * n,N .) By Lemmas 8 and 9, any -well-supported equilibrium of G A is given by a (2n + 2)-tuple X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]), with xi,1 + xi,2 ≈ δ i for all i ∈ [n], where δ = 1/N = 1/2 n . Our construction of G A has each player P simulate player of the polymatrix game A, ∈ [n]. The goal is to show at the end that, after normalizing (x ,1 , x ,2 ), i.e., probabilities of P playing s1, s2 in an -well-supported Nash equilibrium X of G A , into a distribution (y 2 −1 , y 2 ):
and
the (2n)-tuple y = (y1, . . . , y2n) obtained from X must be a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of A.
Note that by x ,1 + x ,2 ≈ δ we have
For P to simulate player of the polymatrix game A, we perturb the original payoff function payoff * of P in G * n,N in a way such that the two linear forms A 2 −1 · y and A 2 · y of y appear as additive terms in the expected payoffs u (s1, X ) and u (s2, X ) of P from playing s1 and s2, respectively.
Let u * (σ, X ) denote the expected payoff of P in the original generalized radix game G * n,N from strategy σ ∈ {s1, s2}. More specifically, we would like to perturb payoff functions of game G * n,N such that expected payoffs of each player P in an -well-supported Nash equilibrium X of G A satisfy
where ξ * is a parameter small enough to make sure that the resulting game is ξ-close to G * n,N . If we can perturb payoff functions of P in G * n,N such that (4) holds in every -well-supported equilibrium X , then the y obtained from X using (3) must be a (1/n)-well-supported equilibrium of A. To see this, assume for contradiction that
but y 2 > 0. Using (4), u (s1, X ) is bigger than u (s2, X ) by ξ * /n (assuming errors hidden in (4) are negligible). As long as our choice of ξ * satisfies ξ * /n > , we must have x ,2 = 0 and thus, y 2 = 0 from (3), a contradiction.
However, perturbing G * n,N so that (4) holds is challenging. While the additive terms on the RHS of (4) other than u * are merely linear forms of (xj,1, xj,2 : j = ), they are extremely difficult to obtain due to the symmetric payoff structure of anonymous games: the expected payoff of P is a linear form of PrX [P , k], the probability of P seeing k under X . Since PrX [P , k] is a complex and symmetric expression of mixed strategies in X , it is not clear how to perturb payoff functions of G * n,N to obtain the desired linear forms on the RHS of (4). This is where the property that xi,1 + xi,2 ≈ δ i helps us tremendously. Recall that this holds as long as the game G A is ξ-close to G * n,N . The core of the construction of G A uses the following key technical lemma which we refer to as the estimation lemma in the paper.
Lemma 10 (Estimation Lemma
n . Given any ∈ [n] and j = ∈ [n], one can compute in polynomial time in n two vectors B [ ,j] and C [ ,j] of length |K| (indexed by k ∈ K) such that every X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z :
We prove the estimation lemma in Section 4.
Using the estimation lemma we can derive linear forms of PrX [P , k] that are close additive approximations of the two linear forms of (xj,1, xj,2 : j = ) on the RHS of (4).
Reduction from Polymatrix Games
Given vectors B
[ ,j] and C [ ,j] from the estimation lemma, we are ready to finish the construction of G A .
Let A ∈ [0, 1] 2n×2n denote an input polymatrix game. We need the following parameters:
Game 3 (Construction of G A ).
We use the polynomial-time algorithm of the estimation lemma to compute two vectors
. Starting with G * n,N , we perturb the payoff function of each P as follows (payoff functions of Q, R remain unchanged). Let payoff * be the payoff function of P in G * n,N . Then
for all k ∈ K; other payoffs of P remain the same, i.e.,
A few properties of G A follow directly from the construction. . We have
By Lemma 8, every -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G A is given by a (2n + 2)-tuple X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]). We also get the following corollary from Lemma 9.
Corollary 12. Every -well-supported Nash equilibrium X of G A satisfies xi,1 + xi,2 = δ i ± λ for all i ∈ [n].
As conditions of the estimation lemma are met, we have Property 13. Given any -well-supported equilibrium X of G A , expected payoffs u (s1, X ) and u (s2, X ) of player P satisfy (4) with an error term of absolute value bounded from above by O(n 3 ξ * δ).
We are now ready to show that, given an -well-supported equilibrium X of G A , the vector y derived from X using (3) is a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of A. Lemma 14. Given any -well-supported Nash equilibrium X = (xi,1, xi,2, y, z : i ∈ [n]) of G A , the vector y derived from X using (3) is a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of A.
Proof. First note that xi,1 + xi,2 > 0 so y is well defined and satisfies y2i−1 + y2i = 1 for all i.
Assume towards a contradiction that y derived using (3) is not a (1/n)-well-supported equilibrium of A, i.e., there is a player ∈ [n] such that, without loss of generality,
but y 2 > 0, which in turn implies that x ,2 > 0.
Since xj,1 + xj,2 = δ j ± λ, we have
Similarly we also have y2j = N j xj,2 ± O (N 2n λ). Combining these with Property 13, we have
By our choices of parameters we have nξ * N 2n λ n 3 ξ * δ so the former can be absorbed into the latter.
Combining the assumption and (5) (as well as the fact of u * (s1, X ) = u * (s2, X ), because payoffs of s1 and s2 are the same in the generalized radix game G * n,N ), we have
for sufficiently large n, by our choices of δ, ξ * and . It then follows that x ,2 = 0 since X is an -well-supported equilibrium of G A , contradicting with y 2 > 0.
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 14 together with Theorem 4 implies that the problem of finding an -well-supported equilibrium in an anonymous game with seven strategies and payoffs from [−1, 3] is hard in PPAD. The gap between Lemma 14 and the hardness part of Theorem 1 (approximate vs well-supported Nash equilibria; n 6 vs n c , for any c > 0, in the exponent of ) can be filled in using standard arguments; see the full paper [11] for details.
THE ESTIMATION LEMMA
We now prove the estimation lemma (Lemma 10). Recall that the n main players P1, . . . , Pn are interested in pure strategies s1, s2, t only. For convenience, we use xi,3 to denote the probability of Pi playing t (so probabilities of Pi playing s1, s2, t are xi,1, xi,2, xi,3, with b x i,b = 1).
Although x i,b 's are unknown variables, by the assumption of the estimation lemma we are guaranteed in X that
Informally, our goal is to show that this restrictive structure of well-supported Nash equilibria allows us to remove anonymity by proving that each player P can obtain a close approximation of every other player's probabilities of playing strategies s1 and s2, using linear forms of PrX [P , k]'s.
More specifically, we fix two distinct integers r, ∈ [n] in the rest of this section, and the goal is to derive an additive approximation of the unknown xr,1 for P using a linear form of the following probabilities:
where
and k b denotes the random variable that counts players playing s b , b ∈ {1, 2}, other than P herself.
First we give some intuition of the proof, by showing how one can get a good estimate of x1,1 and x2,1, assuming > 2.
Estimating x1,1 and x2,1 (Informal).
Let k1 and k2 denote the number of players playing strategies s1 and s2 observed by player P , > 2. Because N = 2 n is large and δ = 1/N is small, we have
Using xi,1 + xi,2 ≈ δ i , we have
Combining all three estimates, we have
Since x2,1 ≤ δ 2 +λ the linear form on the LHS is an additive approximation of x2,1.
We need some notation in order to generalize and formalize this idea. Let S = [n] \ { }, the set of main players other than player P . We write L = {i ∈ S : i ≤ r} and m = |L|, i.e., L = [r] and m = r when > r, and L = [r] \ { } and m = r − 1 when < r. Here L is the set of m players other than player P that are most likely to play s1 and s2, which given our choice of δ implies that any player not in L has an exponentially smaller probability of playing s1 or s2.
We start by understanding the following probabilities
Each of these probabilities considers profiles in which m − j players play s1; j players play s2; n − 1 − m players play t, then sums up probabilities of all such profiles. Further, regardless of j, each probability in (8) only considers profiles in which exactly m players play s1 or s2. Consequently, it will become clear that any profile in which a player from S \ L plays s1 or s2 has too small of a probability to significantly affect these probabilities (so their contribution will just be absorbed into the error term).
For j ∈ [0 : m], let ∆j be the set of partitions (S1, S2, S3) of S into three sets of size |S1| = m − j, |S2| = j and |S3| = n − 1 − m. So, by definition, we have
From (6), we can write xi,1 + xi,2 = δ i + λi for some λi with |λi| ≤ λ. We can substitute to get
(9) Given this specific form (9) of Pr[k1 = m − j, k2 = j ], we now give a brief overview of the proof structure, which we split into three sections. In the first section, we will simplify the expression by absorbing most of the partitions in ∆j as well as all the terms with λi into a small error term, which we will then be able to ignore for the rest of the proof. Then in the second section, we will examine the simplified form of each Pr[k1 = m−j, k2 = j ] and show that each has a similar structure that is a linear form of certain multinomials. In the third section, we will show that these similar structures allow us to eliminate all of the multivariate multinomial terms using a linear combination of the Pr[k1 = m − j, k2 = j ]. Finally, we will show that using the same linear combinations for other values of m allows us to isolate xr,1.
Absorbing Insignificant Terms
We first simplify (9) by absorbing profiles with at least one player in S \ L playing s1 or s2 into a small error term. Accordingly, we split ∆j into two sets ∆ * j and ∆ j : (S1, S2, S3) ∈ ∆j is in ∆ * j if S1 ∪ S2 = L; otherwise, it is in ∆ j . This splits the sum in (9) into two sums accordingly, one over ∆ * j and one over ∆ j . We show in the following lemma that the contribution from the second sum is negligible.
Lemma 15. Given the parameters in (6), we have
Proof. It suffices to show that
Since every term on the RHS is nonnegative, we have
given that λi = δ n 2 in (6). Let h(T ) = i∈T δ i . For (10) , it now suffices to show that
For this purpose note that h(T ) ≤ δ · h(L) for any T such that T ⊆ S, |T | = m, but T = L. It is also easy to see that there is at most one T such that h(T ) = δ · h(L). As every other T has h(T ) ≤ δ 2 · h(L) and the total number of T 's is no more than 2 n−1 = N/2, we have
Combining (9) and Lemma 15, Pr[k1 = m − j, k2 = j ] is
Next we use the fact that λi is sufficiently small to further simplify this estimate by absorbing λi's into the error term.
Proof. Note that the number of S1's is at most 2 n−1 < N . Fixing an S1 and multiplying out
will yield 3 j · 3 n−1−m ≤ 3 n−1 < N 2 terms. But the absolute value of each term with at least one λi is at most λ because all factors are less than or equal to 1. There are at most N 2 many such terms for each S1, and there are at most N many S1's. Using N 3 λ δh(L) from (6), we can absorb all terms with at least one λi into the error term O(δ · h(L)).
Similar Structures
Using Lemma 16 and i /
To understand the RHS better, we would like to distribute each of the (δ i −xi,1) and try to simplify the resulting multinomial. In order to provide this simplification, we define a smaller multinomial P 
Proof. Note that each monomial that appears on either side of (11) is of the form i∈T xi,1 for some T ⊆ L with
Fix such a T . The coefficient of i∈T xi,1 on the RHS is
On the other hand, for an S1 ⊆ L of |S1| = m − j, we have Hence, i∈T xi,1 occurs exactly once in this sum if and only if S1 ⊆ T , and will take the form 
Eliminating Multinomials
Taking a step back, we have derived a set of linear equations that hold with high precision over P 
This then allows us to attain an additive approximation for P m 1 using a linear form of probabilities in (12) . Note that
is a linear form of xi,1's, i ∈ L, including xr,1. Recall that r is the largest integer in L. So from here, it will be straightforward to get an approximation of xr,1.
The next lemma gives a linear form to approximate P Proof. By Corollary 18 (and replacing j in it by m − j), we see that it suffices to show that
Consider P So the RHS of (14) is
For d = 1, the coefficient of P m 1 is clearly 1. For d > 1, using
Lemma 19 gives us a linear form to approximate P in (13) and (15), we have
As a result, we have obtained a linear form 
